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Summary	  
 
Land use planning is a key arena for the 
spectacles of localism and marketisation 
being staged by our self-proclaimed 
greenest government ever. A new 
“presumption in favour of sustainable 
development” aims to encourage 
housebuilding and other development by 
simplifying and decentralising the 
planning system, while protecting the 
natural environment. This protection is in 
part to be achieved through a new market 
in off-site mitigation, supplementing 
existing policies which (can) require on-
site mitigation of habitat degradation. The 
proposed system allows developers to 
offset deleterious impacts on biodiversity 
in one place by paying for improvements 
somewhere else, at a market rate. 
 
The message is that this “habitat banking” 
system will not only aggregate small 
habitats into ecologically significant 
reserves, while facilitating the 
‘development’ we allegedly need to escape 
financial crisis, but also open up new 
income streams for landowners and 
reserve managers to spend on habitat 
conservation. By moving mitigation 
somewhere else, however, it will also 
reinforce the message that humans and 
other species live in separate places, that 
the non-human is not present in everyday 
life, but inhabits a separate world, which is 
fragile and in need of protection. This 
paper argues that displacing and 
marketising the mitigation of habitat 
degradation may serve  to entrench this 
separation, thus retarding rather than 
facilitating the emergence of ecologically 
sustainable human settlements. It examines 
the use of habitat banking and biodiversity 
offsetting in the English planning system, 
and situates this in an international 
context, before offering some brief 
reflections on its likely effects and broader 
implications. 
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1:	  Development	  and	  
Biodiversity	  
1.1)	  Planning	  Reform:	  Good	  for	  
Growth	  and	  Good	  for	  
Biodiversity?	  
	  
Reform of the planning system is said to 
be needed in order to ‘cut red tape’ and 
thereby facilitate the increased levels of 
development which will allow our 
economy to grow. 
 
This is not a new claim: it has been an 
article of faith for the Conservative Party 
ever since the 1947 Town and Country 
Planning Act was passed. It probably 
reflects an instinctive opposition to the 
perceived socialism of the idea, inherent in 
land-use planning, that landowners should 
not be allowed to simply do whatever they 
like with ‘their’ land.  
 
The 2012 National Policy Planning 
Framework (NPPF) states that 
 
“At the heart of the NPPF is a 
presumption in favour of 
sustainable development, which 
should be seen as a golden thread 
running through both plan-making 
and decision-taking.”1 
 
This rhetoric is  reminiscent of the 
Thatcher era White Paper “Lifting the 
Burden”, which proclaimed that “there is 
always a presumption in favour of 
development”2. The word ‘sustainable’ has 
been added this time around, but the 
message is the same: land-use planning 
should encourage economic growth, not 
restrain it. The NPPF continues 
 
“The purpose of planning is to help 
achieve sustainable development. 
Sustainable means ensuring that 
better lives for ourselves don’t 
mean worse lives for future 
generations. Development means 
growth. We must accommodate the 
new ways by which we will earn 
our living in a competitive world.”3 
(emphasis added) 
 
It would, apparently, be old-fashioned to 
think that this growth might have 
damaging consequences for the 
environment. The 2011 Natural 
Environment White Paper (NEWP) leaves 
little room for doubt: 
 
“We reject the outdated idea that 
environmental action is a barrier to 
growth, or that achieving economic 
development and a healthy natural 
environment are incompatible 
objectives.”4 
 
Putting the planning reforms into the 
context of broader environmental policy, 
NEWP states that the new streamlined 
planning system will in fact “contribute to 
our objective of no net loss of 
biodiversity”.5 
 
1.2)	  Introducing	  Biodiversity	  
Offsetting	  
This feat of ‘having your cake and eating 
it’ is in part to be achieved by biodiversity 
offsetting:  
 
“Biodiversity offsets are 
conservation activities designed to 
deliver biodiversity benefits in 
compensation for losses in a 
measurable way. Good 
developments incorporate 
biodiversity considerations in their 
design but are still likely to result 
in some biodiversity loss. One way 
to compensate for this loss is by 
offsetting: the developer secures 
compensatory habitat expansion or 
restoration elsewhere.”6 
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These offsets will replace or supplement 
existing arrangements for securing 
mitigation through ‘section 106’ 
agreements7  and planning conditions. The 
claim is that this makes things easier for 
all concerned, as well as producing better 
conservation outcomes by aggregating 
small pockets of green space into larger 
areas. Offset purchases are also being 
suggested as an ex-post remedy for 
accidental damage to biodiversity (for 
example due to pollution incidents), 
facilitating compliance with the European 
Environmental Liability Directive, which 
came into force in 2010.8 
 
Voluntary pilot schemes are starting this 
year in six areas: Warwickshire, Coventry 
and Solihull; Essex; Devon; Greater 
Norwich; Doncaster and North 
Nottinghamshire.9 The proposal is that 
central government will eventually set up a 
legally binding framework for biodiversity 
offsetting and banking, and mandate 
standard approaches to be applied to the 
valuation of habitats. As yet this has not 
happened: the current two year pilots are 
voluntary, and intended to inform 
DEFRA’s subsequent development of 
guidance and legislation. Volunteering 
local authorities have some leeway in how 
they operate their schemes, but they are 
subject to ‘quality assurance’ provided by 
Natural England as regards conservation 
standards and verification, and are 
expected to follow detailed DEFRA 
guidance on the ‘metrics’ used to calculate 
what offsets are appropriate. 
 
Local planning authorities (LPAs) 
participating in the trial will process 
applications “in line with the normal 
development management process, 
including avoiding and mitigating impacts 
on biodiversity”, except that where “there 
is some biodiversity loss that requires 
compensation under planning policy, 
developers will be able to choose whether 
to meet this requirement by using the 
offsetting mechanism”. Where developers 
decide to participate in the pilot, “local 
authorities will secure the implementation 
of the offset via a planning mechanism 
such as Section 106, or planning 
conditions.”10  
 
It is important to recall that the “normal 
development management process” is 
itself undergoing radical change, as the 
strongly pro-development NPPF has 
entered into force almost simultaneously 
with the beginning of these pilots, 
superseding the previous far more detailed 
policy framework. While the final 
document did make some concessions 
compared with earlier drafts, concerns 
remain that the NPPF will in effect reduce 
protection for “ordinary” rural areas which 
are not covered by specific designations. 
These are precisely the sorts of areas likely 
to be involved in offsetting, and guidance 
issued to participating LPAs makes clear 
that “biodiversity policies in Local Plans 
should be consistent with the principles 
and policies set out in the NPPF”.11 
 
1.3)	  Developers	  and	  Habitat	  
Bankers	  
Developers “can provide an offset 
themselves if they are able to do so, or 
they can commission someone else to do it 
for them”.12 A key feature of the scheme is 
that offsets can be traded: a developer can 
deliver the required biodiversity offset by 
simply buying credits from landowners or 
reserve managers, who have accumulated 
these credits by undertaking to create, 
restore or manage habitat in line with 
standards set down by central and local 
government. By selling credits, these 
landowners gain a new income stream, 
which helps ensure the viability of 
continued habitat protection. Habitat 
serves as a proxy for biodiversity, as 
explained below.  
 
This is where the idea of habitat banking 
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comes in. This is defined as 
 
“a market where credits from 
actions with beneficial biodiversity 
outcomes can be purchased to 
offset the debit from environmental 
damage. Credits can be produced 
in advance of, and without ex-ante 
links to, the debits they compensate 
for, and stored over time”. 13 
 
Unlike the present situation, where 
funding for managing land for biodiversity 
is scarce, the vision is that offsetting 
requirements will stimulate substantial 
demand for the credits associated with 
habitat, making such management a 
commercially viable use of land. The idea 
is that providing habitat will become an 
attractive business proposition for 
landowners. Offset markets will 
incentivise them to proactively ‘bank’ 
conservation credits by investing in the 
creation or restoration of larger areas of 
habitat, calculating that their investment 
will be profitably repaid in the future from 
the sale of credits to developers. It is these 
banks (containing both habitat covered by 
credits already paid for, and habitat which 
is ‘banked’ awaiting the sale of credits) 
that are intended to provide the benefits of 
aggregating all the little bits of habitat 
together into larger ecologically valuable 
areas.  
 
1.4)	  Nature	  Brokers	  and	  Offset	  
Promoters	  
As part of this system, nature (in the guise 
of conservation credits) becomes a 
tradeable asset, giving rise to new market 
opportunities. Indeed, a recent report by 
DEFRA’s ‘Ecosystem Markets Task 
Force’ ranks biodiversity offsetting as the 
number one new business opportunity in 
UK environmental markets.14 Private 
sector groups want a slice of this cake, and 
have indeed been heavily involved in 
baking it. One key player is a company 
called the Environment Bank, established 
in 2009 by professional ecologists. This 
company received £175,000 in 2011 from 
the Shell Foundation to assist with the 
development of ecosystem service 
markets15 and describes itself as having 
been “established to facilitate mitigation 
and compensation schemes associated with 
planned development”.16 
 
The Environment Bank claims that the 
existing system produces “pitiful, poorly 
executed piecemeal schemes often 
repositories for supermarket trolleys, 
rather than providing a haven for 
wildlife”17. They have been enthusiastic 
promoters of the idea that it would be 
better for everyone if planners allowed 
developers to use offsetting instead, by 
buying conservation credits and spending 
them with an approved provider of habitat 
– of nature – somewhere else. They offer 
to “assess the credit requirements of 
development sites, irrespective of intended 
use (i.e. residential, commercial, 
infrastructure etc), and source receptor 
sites from our registration system that can 
deliver the credits”.18 The company is 
already involved in running one of 
DEFRA’s pilot schemes.19 Its chairman, 
David Hill, is also the deputy chair of 
Natural England, who are in charge of 
“quality assurance” for these pilots. Other 
environmental brokerage firms in the UK, 
such as Climate Change Capital (now 
owned by US agribusiness firm Bunge), 
are similarly positioning themselves to act 
as offset brokers.20 
 
The emerging conservation banking 
market in the UK has to a large extent 
been inspired by the US wetland 
mitigation banking and species banking 
markets, as well as by other conservation 
banking markets in countries including 
Germany, Australia, Brazil and South 
Africa.21 Both DEFRA and the 
Environment Bank are represented on the 
advisory board of the Business and 
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Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP), 
an influential international body set up to 
“test and develop best practice on 
biodiversity offsets and conservation 
banking worldwide”.22 
 
The Environment Bank has recently 
launched an online conservation credit 
trading platform23 for England, described 
by Hill as “a definitive market mechanism 
that will give developers greater certainty 
from the planning process”, which “will 
deliver truly sustainable development”.24 
This website is not freestanding, but is an 
integrated part of the international 
mmEarth.com platform, hosted in the US 
by Mission MarketsTM, a “boutique 
professional services firm specializing in 
the impact and sustainability sectors”25 
who broker investment deals in carbon 
credit, wetland mitigation banking, species 
banking, and other similar markets. 26 
 
1.5)	  Towards	  a	  Global	  Biodiversity	  
Market?	  
The introduction of offsetting in England 
is seen by actual and potential participants 
in the emerging global biodiversity credits 
market as a key step towards later 
expansion across the EU and beyond. In 
the words of a Climate Change Capital 
report: 
 
“There is a unique opportunity to 
successfully render a working and 
effective system that can be 
replicated, improved and expanded 
across Europe and throughout the 
world. [...] As a centre of global 
finance and trade, the UK can play 
a pivotal role in creating market 
rules that are workable and possess 
robust environmental integrity. 
This will be particularly important 
for one of the main barriers to 
creating a deep and liquid 
biodiversity market attractive to 
investors: selecting an appropriate 
“currency” or common unit of 
account.”27  
 
In a sobering glimpse of a possible future, 
a recent report by the right-wing think tank 
Policy Exchange explicitly recommends 
allowing developers in the UK to offset 
their activities by buying conservation 
credits not from UK providers but 
internationally, from for instance “an NGO 
operating a conservation scheme at an 
important international site”. The reason 
they give is that this “would deliver a 
greater global-level biodiversity 
improvement for a particular sum of 
money”.28  
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
properly discuss the many issues which 
could arise should such an 
internationalised market in biodiversity 
credits be successfully constructed. We do 
however note the parallels with global 
carbon markets. Recent research on forest 
carbon trading under REDD+ schemes has 
highlighted the considerable dangers of 
market distortion and undue influence 
which arise under conditions of 
monopsony or oligopsony (meaning a 
market with only one or very few buyers, 
as in monopoly/oligopoly which refers to 
one or few sellers).29 As with forest 
carbon, there are very few global 
intermediaries with the financial and 
technical resources to validate, source and 
market conservation credits as 
commodities. These intermediaries may be 
able to leverage substantial profits in 
secondary financial markets from 
derivative products based on the 
commodities they are marketing, and 
fluctuations in these secondary markets 
could have large and unpredictable effects 
on prices and conditions in an underlying 
offset market.30 
 
Even within national or sub-national 
biodiversity offset markets, it is important 
to note that the alleged benefits of a 
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competitive market are likely to be 
reduced if one or few players achieve 
positions of disproportionate influence. 
This could arise, for instance, if too many 
transactions were funnelled through a 
single intermediary body, or if there were 
undue overlap between the bodies sourcing 
and validating conservation credits, and 
the bodies connecting offset providers to 
the market. 
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2:	  Design	  Principles	  for	  Trading	  
Nature	  
Several core design principles underpin 
conservation banking and associated offset 
markets. Here we briefly discuss five: 
 
- the mitigation hierarchy and the 
circular logic of ‘unavoidability’ 
- the legitimation of off-site mitigation 
- the principle of additionality 
- the construction of metrics that create 
apparent commensurability between 
places 
- the key role of enabling policy and 
governance frameworks. 
 
All of these are constructed as working for 
the overarching principle of ‘no net loss of 
biodiversity’, or even more optimistically, 
‘net gain’, producing the somewhat 
unintuitive assertion that ‘the environment’ 
will benefit from the transformations 
associated with development activity.  
 
2.1)	  The	  Mitigation	  Hierarchy	  and	  
the	  Circular	  Logic	  of	  
‘Unavoidability’	  	  
The widely adopted ‘mitigation hierarchy’ 
concept seeks to reduce the foreseen harm 
of a development intervention as far as 
possible, by adopting a staged approach to 
environmental mitigation. The first stage is 
to consider how harm might be avoided, 
including whether the development should 
take place at all in the proposed location. 
Secondly, measures should be taken to 
ensure that any harm arising is minimised. 
Thirdly, the ecology and landscape of a 
development site should be restored after 
the lifespan of the development, so as to 
rehabilitate and reinstate remaining 
unavoidable harm. Compensation, 
including measures such as biodiversity 
offsets, is the last resort of the mitigation 
hierarchy. A biodiversity offset is 
influentially defined as 
 
“a commitment to compensate for 
significant residual adverse 
impacts on biodiversity identified 
after appropriate avoidance, 
minimization and on-site 
rehabilitation measures have been 
taken according to the mitigation 
hierarchy.”31 
 
This ‘last resort’ stage is increasingly 
interpreted in such a way as to permit the 
creation of conservation credit markets. 
When environmentally damaging 
development, and the ensuing harm, is 
rationalised as unavoidable, this apparent 
unavoidability legitimises the idea of 
compensation, understood as off-site 
mitigation or offsetting. This reinterprets 
conservation as development-led, in that 
conservation activity now takes place 
because of, and funded by, development. 
All this, of course, can serve to obscure the 
key issues of who decides what 
development, and what environmental 
damage, is unavoidable where, and why. 
 
2.2)	  Off-­‐site	  Mitigation	  
Advocates maintain that off-site mitigation 
will consolidate rather than fragment areas 
of ecological value, helping create and 
maintain resilient ecological networks (as 
recently recommended in the UK by the 
Lawton report).32 It is also presented as 
desirable for developers, since it provides 
a “simple, streamlined and secure” route 
through the planning process, that limits 
“long-term management costs and 
liabilities” and will result in an “increased 
net developable area – because any habitat 
creation is done off-site”.33 
 
The pictures below provide a schematic 
representation of how such consolidation 
is imagined.34 The planned development 
area is clearly consolidated and expanded 
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in the lower diagram, with conserved 
habitat also consolidated to a narrow linear 
band cutting through the centre of the 
development. Whether or not there is more 
environmental conservation value present 
here than in the mosaic of developed and 
conserved areas depicted in the so-called 
unplanned development of the upper 
diagram is, however, open to question. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3)	  Additionality	  
The third principle is that of 
‘additionality’, as used in the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme for carbon 
dioxide, and in other environmental 
markets such as that in sulphuric dioxide 
credits facilitated by the US Clean Air Act. 
In these structures a marketised transaction 
(of a unit of environmental health and 
harm) is permitted on the basis that this 
will manifest as a reduction of 
environmental harm that is measurably 
additional to that which would have 
occurred without the exchange.35 In 
conservation banking markets, a 
conservation activity is considered 
additional (and hence legitimately credit-
bearing) only if it would not have occurred 
in the absence of a payment.36   
 
Payment is thus considered to have 
directly caused the measurable 
conservation effect, and hence to have 
generated conservation additionality. This 
can be difficult or impossible to 
demonstrate. At a conceptual level this is 
because it requires detailed counterfactual 
knowledge of what ‘would have happened’ 
in the absence of the payment, which can 
never be conclusive. In practice a further 
problem has been that to date many 
conservation banking and offsetting 
schemes have simply designated localities 
of existing relatively untransformed 
habitat. 
 
In US species banking, for example, most 
(107 of 123) banks were listed in June 
2010 as preserving already conserved 
habitat.37 As such, species banks increase 
the credit-bearing (and thus the financial) 
value of land areas under formal, usually 
private tenure, but do not necessarily 
enhance conservation additionality or 
ensure no net loss of species presence. The 
actual efficacy of these schemes seems 
hard to establish with impartiality or 
certainty. One researcher writes that 
“annual reports from conservation 
managers, easement holders and agency 
biologists appear to indicate that generally 
conservation banking is an ecologically 
successful method for offsetting impacts to 
many species”, but that “detailed 
biological studies […] have yet to be 
conducted”.38 Three data based reviews of 
USA species banking suggest that 
ecological success is unclear.39 
 
The additionality aspect of conservation 
banking may also generate counter-
productive outcomes in which actions 
enhancing environmental health manifest 
only if they are associated with monetary 
payments. In economic parlance, this 
would constitute a perverse incentive. It 
risks displacing or “crowding out”40 
10  | Green House 
 
environmentally caring activities done for 
aesthetic or moral reasons, or in 
acknowledgement of intrinsic values 
associated with nonhuman natures, by 
reducing such practices to a monetary 
value. This can create contexts in which 
such practices  cease  unless they are paid 
for.41 
 
2.4)	  Ecosystem	  Metrics:	  
Constructing	  
Commensurability	  	  
Habitat banking markets require a policy 
framework that permits exchanges in 
credit-bearing conservation units to occur 
between different localities. This in turn 
requires conversion of the affected aspect 
of nature into a symbolic numerical 
measure, in order to make two different 
places commensurable with each other, 
and also able to assume the monetary 
value (price) required for a marketised 
exchange.  
 
In US species banking, species credits are 
awarded by the Fish and Wildlife Service 
(FWS) for the same species that will be 
harmed by development, and tend to be 
based on relatively direct measures such as 
acreage of appropriate habitat conserved, 
created or restored, or on populations of 
breeding pairs. Currently these must 
involve land areas in relatively close 
proximity to the affected population. 
However, through application of an 
indirect habitat scoring methodology (as 
described below), habitat banking as 
proposed in the UK instead allows for 
conservation investments to involve 
habitats that are both different to, and 
geographically distant from, the habitat 
impacted by development. In addition, 
‘[c]redits can be produced in advance of, 
and without ex-ante links to, the debits 
they compensate for, and stored over 
time’.42 This mirrors the US wetland 
mitigation banking industry, in which 
conservation credits can be sold after sites 
have received their status as a conservation 
bank but prior to being able to 
demonstrate ecological performance 
compliance.43  
 
As ecosystemic values are translated into 
numerical ones, an array of additional 
scoring ‘multipliers’ can be added into the 
mix to deal with varied sources of risk, 
although as candidly noted by DEFRA 
“[i]f the worst case risk is realised (i.e. if 
the restoration or expansion fails to 
deliver), a multiplier will not solve the 
problem”.44 Financial insurance is also 
proposed such that the offset provider 
could take out insurance against the risk of 
failure to deliver the right number of 
units.45 
 
2.5)	  Enabling	  Policy	  and	  
Governance	  Frameworks	  
Although the declared raison d’être for 
conservation banking is the maintenance 
of nature health through financial 
exchanges on privatised markets, 
government regulation and public 
resources remain essential for both the 
creation and the sustenance of these 
exchanges.46 Regulation can generate 
demand, by establishing mechanisms that 
enforce development-related conservation 
measures. Governments are encouraged by 
offsetting advocates to “engender market 
confidence by establishing the property 
status of [conservation] credits through 
legislation”.47  
 
Public resources can also be used in 
environmental markets to create terms 
attractive to private sector investors and 
entrepreneurs, for example through tax 
breaks and subsidies. States can provide 
regulatory certainty about the value of 
environmental credits, thereby reducing 
private sector risk. Examples include the 
UK government’s decision to set a floor 
price for carbon that protects investments 
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in ‘low-carbon’ electricity generation 
(including nuclear power), and the US 
government’s promise that credits 
purchased now for currently unscheduled 
but imperilled species will satisfy 
mitigation requirements for future land use 
activities if the species later become 
listed.48 
 
The ways in which state support is 
currently provided for conservation 
banking varies between national contexts 
and specific markets. In US species 
banking, for example, the key supportive 
legislation is the 1982 amendment of the 
1973 Federal Endangered Species Act, 
which permitted the establishment of 
species banks which could fund 
themselves at least partly through trading 
species credits. This enables landowners, 
including those seeking to offset their own 
harm, to apply to the FWS to establish 
species banks on their land, thereby 
converting the presence of protected 
species from ‘liabilities’ into economic 
‘assets’.  It also enables developers, public 
or private, to obtain a permit to destroy the 
habitat of threatened or endangered 
species, so long as they buy credits in a 
‘bank’ that protects that species within the 
same ‘service area’.49  
 
Current proposals for habitat banking and 
biodiversity offsets in England, while 
resting firmly on an enabling policy 
framework in which decisions to require 
biodiversity offsets are made by local 
planning authorities, seem in contrast to be 
oriented towards the encouragement of 
voluntary offset transactions, facilitated by 
independent consultants and brokerage 
firms.  
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3:	  Offsetting	  in	  England	  
3.1)	  Metrics	  and	  Proxies	  
Turning to how these design principles 
translate into the specifics of the English 
scheme, the first point to note is that there 
is no proposal to actually measure 
biodiversity as such, in the sense of 
measuring numbers or populations of 
specific species. DEFRA state: 
 
“Biodiversity in its entirety is 
impossible to measure so a ‘metric’ 
is used to represent, and provide a 
measure of, overall biodiversity. 
[...] Metrics are transferable 
between sites and habitats, 
allowing an impact on one habitat 
type to be offset with conservation 
action elsewhere, or involving a 
different habitat type and/or quality 
of habitat. [...] The metric we 
propose for the offsetting pilot is 
based on habitats. Development 
sites need to be mapped and 
divided into habitat parcels. The 
offset requirement (and resulting 
compensation) can then be worked 
out on a habitat basis.”50 
 
Both development sites and offset sites are 
first categorised according to the type(s) of 
habitat involved. Over 300 habitat types 
are identified in the guidance51 but these 
are then grouped into just three 
‘distinctiveness bands’ denoting low, 
medium and high distinctiveness. 
Essentially high distinctiveness covers 
“priority habitat”, medium is “semi-
natural” habitat, and low covers most other 
greenfield land.52  
 
A hectare of habitat can be ‘worth’ 
between 2 and 18 ‘biodiversity units’ 
depending on its condition and its 
‘distinctiveness’:53 
 
 Low Distinct-
iveness 
(2) 
Medium 
Distinct-
iveness 
(4) 
High  
Distinct-
iveness 
(6) 
Good 
condition (3) 6 12 18 
Moderate 
condition (2) 4 8 12 
Poor 
condition (1) 2 4 6 
 
There is also a requirement to “trade up”, 
meaning that the offset site cannot be of 
lower distinctiveness than the development 
site. Low distinctiveness land must be 
offset by the creation or restoration of at 
least medium distinctiveness land, and 
development on high distinctiveness land 
can be offset (if at all) only by habitat of 
the same type. Both the development site 
and the offset site are assessed on this 
matrix, allowing for instance a 
development involving the loss of 6 
hectares of low distinctiveness land in 
poor condition (ie 12 biodiversity units) to 
be offset elsewhere by the restoration of 2 
hectares of high distinctiveness land from 
moderate to good condition.54 
 
This is a key stage in achieving the 
objective of making different habitats 
commensurable. The development site and 
the offset site may be very different, but by 
first using habitat as a proxy for 
biodiversity, and then secondly applying 
numerical formulae, the approach achieves 
the apparent equivalence required to make 
offsetting appear meaningful and 
legitimate. This is portrayed as an attempt 
to move beyond simply measuring area, 
and towards reflecting the complex 
differences between different sites. 
Ironically though, in practice its function is 
to eradicate such differences, and thereby 
present real places as interchangeable, 
rather than as unique and irreplaceable. 
 
3.2)	  Multipliers	  and	  Incentives	  
On the offset side of the equation, three 
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further formulae are applied to this 
‘baseline’ figure, before arriving at the 
final number of biodiversity units which a 
given offset project, involving habitat 
creation or restoration, can deliver. These 
‘multipliers’ aim to adjust the number of 
units delivered by factoring in the project’s 
location, the time taken for it to come to 
fruition, and the risks of it failing to 
deliver the ‘target’ habitat.  
 
The methodology and assumptions of 
these multipliers raise a number of issues, 
the full details of which are beyond the 
scope of this paper. In summary however, 
the multipliers reduce the number of 
saleable units delivered per hectare, in 
proportion to  
 
a) the assessed risk of failure to 
deliver the target habitat in the 
target condition;  
b) the number of years taken to 
deliver the target habitat in the 
target condition; and  
c) how well the project’s location 
fits the local authority’s wider 
biodiversity strategy. 
 
On the face of it, the effect of all this is to 
encourage offset projects to be well 
conceived and realistic, and to be located 
where they will form part of a wider 
network of connected habitats. It also 
incentivises projects which deliver the 
target habitat swiftly, or ideally have 
already done so. In fact the clear and 
acknowledged intent is to incentivise 
habitat banking, since only a habitat bank 
can deliver the risk-free “ready-made” 
habitat required to get the maximum 
possible biodiversity units from its 
available hectares, avoiding any multiplier 
penalties. 
 
This is because, due to the requirement for 
offsets to provide ‘additional benefits’, 
existing habitat cannot be counted as an 
offset except under very specific 
conditions. It must be shown that it would 
not have existed (or would have existed 
only in a poorer condition) were it not for 
measures taken specifically to develop an 
offset for later sale. This cannot be shown 
retrospectively, as the initial condition of 
the site must be formally assessed and 
logged in order to later “prove that 
something additional has been 
delivered”.55 
 
3.3)	  Shopping	  for	  Offsets	  
One of DEFRA’s worked examples of the 
system in operation reads as follows.  
 
“A housing development is 
proposed which will result in the 
loss of 6 hectares of arable field. 
The grassland is of low 
distinctiveness so the habitat score 
is 8x6 = 48 units. The developer 
finds that there are 2 local 
possibilities for offsetting: 
 
Option 1: A habitat bank has 6 
hectares of lowland meadows, 
created specifically for offsetting. 
Their establishment has been very 
good. The risk of failure is low, so 
each hectare is worth 8 units. The 6 
ha area is therefore worth 48 units, 
and would meet the developer’s 
need. 
 
Option 2: In response to the 
enquiry from the developer a local 
offset provider has said he is able 
to initiate a lowland meadow 
recreation scheme. Because of 
inherent uncertainties in the 
creation of this Biodiversity Action 
Plan habitat, associated with seed 
establishment and soil nutrients, 
there is a small delivery risk. It is 
therefore agreed that they should 
apply a multiplier of 2, in order to 
be confident that they will be able 
to deliver 48 biodiversity units. So 
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they will be recreating the 
grassland over a 12 ha area. 
 
Both options are worth the same 
number of units. The developer can 
select their preferred option, based 
on price.”56 
 
Although no indication is given, it seems 
likely that the pre-established 6 hectare 
offset might end up as the cheaper option, 
and hence the one likely to be “selected 
based on price”. If so, stripping out the 
terminology of offsetting, what happens 
may simply be that the developer pays 
some money to the habitat bank owner 
(perhaps a local wildlife trust), who use it 
to pay for some additional management 
activities on their existing land, thus 
meeting existing conservation goals. 
 
In return, as the Environment Bank put it, 
not only is the developer’s “liability for 
compensation delivery discharged once 
[planning] permission is received”, but 
they may also get “increased net 
developable area”, as the offset reduces the 
area required for on-site mitigation 
measures.57 In the case of housebuilding 
this may well mean more houses can be 
built on the site, potentially making the 
development more profitable. 
 
3.4)	  Winners	  and	  Losers	  
Clearly, offsetting will be good for 
developers, as it is intended to make it 
easier to gain permission for development, 
and to contribute to a net increase in land 
developed. It will therefore not be good for 
local biodiversity on the land which hosts 
this increased and more intensive 
development. 
 
Biodiversity offsetting could be good for 
habitat bank owners, such as green-leaning 
landowners or those (including wildlife 
trusts and certain NGOs) who manage 
existing reserves, as it potentially opens up 
a new income stream to fund the 
restoration or creation of more habitat. To 
this extent it may be good for local 
biodiversity on the land which hosts the 
new offsets. 
 
There is, however, a substantial risk that 
this new privatised funding stream may 
come to legitimise the reduction of other 
conservation funding, particularly from the 
public purse. As a recent parliamentary 
briefing paper observes: 
 
“Biodiversity markets are being 
increasingly employed as a means 
of incorporating the cost of nature 
conservation into development 
activities.”58 
 
Whether the potential positive biodiversity 
impact of increased conservation funding 
can adequately compensate for the actual 
negative biodiversity impact of increased 
development is, of course, the key 
question. If the overall frame of reference 
is accepted, this arguably becomes an issue 
of detail and implementation. 
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4:	  Reflections	  and	  Conclusions	  
4.1)	  Relationship	  and	  Polarisation	  
We consider it at best unproven that 
offsetting can help build resilient 
ecological networks, or achieve ‘no net 
loss of biodiversity’. But there are more 
fundamental problems with all this than 
whether or not it will ‘work’ on its own 
terms.  In the bigger picture, it is also 
important to ask what the idea of 
biodiversity offsetting says about 
dominant understandings of relationships 
between humans and non-human worlds. 
 
Offsetting cannot, by definition, recognise 
or preserve the value of specific 
relationships between human individuals 
and communities, their local landscapes, 
and their real non-human neighbours. 
Indeed by placing fungibility at the core of 
biodiversity policy it further downgrades 
such relationships, and encourages us all to 
think that one bit of nature is much like 
another. This is clearly not serving the 
broader cause of conservation, and risks 
undermining the work of the many 
organisations, both public and private, who 
strive to (re)build caring and attentive 
connections between people and their local 
environments. 
 
A key message of offsetting, in fact, is that 
human habitat is best separated from non-
human habitat, and that nature is best 
preserved by separating it from our daily 
life and safely enclosing it elsewhere. To 
an extent this problematic message is 
already conveyed by many more 
traditional conservation activities in which 
land is set aside for biodiversity to the 
exclusion of human habitation. It is also 
deeply embedded in existing planning 
policy, as evidenced by the difficulty of 
gaining permission for new dwellings 
associated with small-scale land-based 
lifestyles.59 The new offsets paradigm 
explicitly entrenches the idea that nature 
can and should be concentrated away from 
humans, and also legitimises the creation 
of human places from which nature is ever 
more absent. Reinforcing such polarisation 
distracts from the urgent need to 
(re)discover ways of living which integrate 
human and non-human habitat. 
 
It is no coincidence that this human/non-
human polarisation is reminiscent of other 
polarisations resulting from neoliberal 
economic policy, such as the global trend 
toward increasing inequality of wealth. 
Just as low-income families are 
increasingly being rehoused away from 
desirable parts of cities like London, so 
nature is to be ‘rehoused’ out of the way of 
lucrative development.60  
 
4.2)	  Transferring	  Significance:	  
What	  is	  Conserved?	  
Is this conservation? It is presented as 
such, so it should perhaps be judged as 
such. Commissioned by a statutory 
conservation body to reflect on the ethics 
of conservation, environmental 
philosophers Kate Rawles and Alan 
Holland came up with the following 
influential, if initially surprising definition: 
 
 “[C]onservation has as much to 
do with conserving the future as 
with conserving the past. It is not, 
however, simply about preserving 
the potential for future exuberance, 
but about preserving the future as a 
realisation of the potential of the 
past. [...] Conservation is about 
negotiating the transition from 
past to future in such a way as to 
secure the transfer of maximum 
significance.” (emphasis added)61 
 
Biodiversity offsetting renders it 
acceptable for the ecological and 
biodiversity “potential of the past” 
inherent in a development site to be simply 
lost. The place which disappears under a 
new development has not been conserved. 
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The real plants and animals that existed 
there have gone, along with the place’s 
history, and whatever else might have 
previously been valued about it. In 
Holland and Rawles’s terms, this means 
that none of the significance of the place is 
transferred to the future. On this basis, no 
conservation has happened. What has been 
conserved is an abstraction: a net amount 
of habitat, which serves as a proxy for a 
net amount of biodiversity, both of which 
are located elsewhere.  
 
What is conserved is, at best, a net amount 
of nonspecific ‘biodiversity credit’, 
entirely decontextualised and transformed 
into numbers. This new fictitious 
commodity62  is divorced from both time 
and space – it exists outside history and 
has no place. It has been made liquid and 
become ‘natural capital’, which can be 
moved from one bank account to another. 
This shows the real focus of the new 
‘green economy’ ideology: it is explicitly 
about the conservation and accumulation 
of capital, not of nature. 
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